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Abstract
International di¤erences in fuel taxation are huge, and may be jus-
tied by di¤erent local negative externalities that taxes must correct,
as well as by di¤erent preferences for public spending. In this context,
should a worldwide unique carbon tax be added to these local taxes
to correct the global warming externality? We address this question
in a second best framework à la Ramsey, where public goods have
to be nanced through distortionary taxation and the cost of public
funds has to be weighted against the utility of public goods. We show
that when lump-sum transfers between countries are allowed for, the
second best tax on the polluting good may be decomposed into three
parts: one, country specic, dealing with the local negative external-
ity, a second one, country specic, dealing with the cost of public
funds, and a third one, global, dealing with the global externality and
which can be interpreted as the carbon price. Our main contribution
is to show that the uniqueness of the carbon price should still hold
in this second best framework. Nevertheless, if lump-sum transfers
between governments are impossible to implement, international dif-
ferentiation of the carbon price is the only way to take care of equity
concerns.
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1 Introduction1
The virtues of a unique carbon price, taking the form of a world carbon tax
or a world emission permits market, are well recognized. A unique carbon
price, reecting the true social cost of emissions, is the best incentive to
curb all the negative externalities associated with fossil fuel consumption and
global warming. Uniqueness of the price implies the equalization of marginal
abatement costs and therefore minimizes the worldwide cost of abatement
of emissions. The redistribution of tax receipts or the initial allocation of
permits o¤ers then the possibility to accompany carbon taxation with an
international redistribution scheme and to share equitably the burden of
taxation between countries.
This optimistic picture is often questionned in the name of realism. Exist-
ing di¤erences in national energy taxation, especially fuel taxation, are im-
portant (see Table 1). The question that arises is whether we should consider
them as implicit carbon taxes and therefore abstain from super-imposing a
specic carbon tax.
Table 1: Excise on unleaded gasoline in some OECD countries, 2008 (%
of the consumer price)
Germany Denmark United States F in land France Ita ly Japan United K ingdom Sweden
46.7 38.7 14.5 42.9 43.6 40.9 34.2 44.5 40.6
Source: IEA Statistics, Energy prices and taxes, 2009
Moreover, is it really possible to use the allocation of tax receipts or emis-
sion quotas to alter substantially the world distribution of income? First of
all, using a quota allocation mechanism clearly implies that the implied lump-
sum transfers to local governments are restricted to be positive. Second, will
governments even accept to depart from the simple rule that each country
should be paid back exactly the amount of taxes it pays or the value of the
permits it had to buy? If international transfers are so restricted, isnt it
preferable to allow poor countries to face a lower carbon price? Chichilnisky
and Heal [1994] put forward such an argument against the international
1We thank Julien Daubanes, Pierre Lasserre, Stéphane Gauthier, and especially Roger
Guesnerie for useful discussions. A. dAutume and K. Schubert acknowledge the sup-
port of the French National Research Agency (ANR) under the CLEANER project
(ANR_NT09_505778).
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equalization of abatement costs and suggested that a lower e¤ort should
be requested from poor countries. Shiell [2003] follows on this idea and in
particular characterizes the set of second best optimal allocations when in-
tercountry transfers are restricted to be positive or to exacly equal the sums
paid to the world regulator.
A proper analyzis of these issues requires a clarication of the purpose
of existing fuel taxes in the rst place. If no clear economic reason may
be invoked for their existence, adding to them a unique carbon price has
no chance to appear optimal. To the contrary, if existing taxes are, in some
sense, already xed at an optimum level, adding a common tax to curb global
warming may make sense. Existing fuel taxation has two prime objectives.
The rst one is to counter local externalities independently of global warming.
For example, burning of fossil fuel contributes to global warming through
CO2, but also leads to SO2 emissions which have a more local e¤ect. The
second objective of fuel taxation is that it o¤ers governments an easy way
to levy funds and nance the provision of public goods. The French gasoline
tax, the so-called TIPP (Taxe Intérieure sur les Produits Pétroliers), an excise
tax currently xed at 0.69 euros per liter, has indeed been created explicitely
with the two objectives of reducing negative externalities associated with fuel
consumption by cars and of providing means to nance highway construction.
International di¤erences in fuel taxation may a priori be justied by dif-
ferent local negative externalities that taxes must correct, as well as by di¤er-
ent preferences for public spending in the di¤erent countries. In this context,
should a worldwide unique carbon tax, or emission permit price, be added
to these optimal local taxes? This is the question we consider.
Addressing seriously the nancing of public goods provision imposes a sec-
ond best approach. Public goods have to be nanced through distortionary
taxation and the cost of these distorsions, i.e., the cost of public funds, has to
be weighted against the utility of public goods. On the other hand, Pigovian
taxes, aiming at reducing negative externalities, and (distortionary) taxes,
aiming at nancing the provision of public goods, are to some extent sub-
stitutes. A Pigovian tax required to decrease emissions is also a means to
nance public spending. Inversely, a negative externality associated with
the production of a commodity decreases the cost of public funds associated
with the use of this good as a tax-base. The negative impact of the distor-
tions associated with taxation are mitigated by the reduction of the negative
externality. Sandmo [1975] initiated this kind of analysis in a one country
case.
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In this paper, we extend the Chichilnisky and Heal [1994] model by intro-
ducing local externalities and public goods. We consider a clean consumption
good, a dirty consumption good, source of both local externalities and global
warming, and a public good. The three goods may be produced in each coun-
try from a given endowment of a generic good. There is no international trade
and countries interact only through global emissions.
We rst examine rst best optimal allocations and show that they can be
implemented by a world government through country-specic emission taxes
and lump-sum transfers to consumers, possibly negative. The pollution tax
consists of two parts, one dealing with the local externality and another one
dealing with the global externality. The latter part is uniform across coun-
tries. This suggests a more decentralized implementation. Local governments
then levy a tax correcting the local externality, are in charge of the provision
of the local public good, and tax or subsidize their consumers in a lump-sum
way. The federal government collects the uniform global pollution tax and
makes lump-sum (positive or negative) transfers to individual states, thus
taking in charge international equity concerns. This implementation assumes
passive local governments, who do not take advantage of the inuence they
might have on the world carbon price and the levels of international trans-
fers. Basically, this preliminary analysis conrms the optimistic view which
we described above. In a rst best setting, the uniqueness of the carbon tax
should be the rule, provided local governmental decisions are taken in an
optimal way.
We then consider a more realistic second best framework. We follow the
standard Ramsey approach and assume that governments cannot tax con-
sumers in a lump-sum way. They have to rely if necessary on distortionary
taxation to nance public good provision. We show that the second best
taxes on the polluting good may be decomposed into three parts: one, coun-
try specic, dealing with the local pollution externality, a second one, country
specic, dealing with the cost of public funds, and a third one, global, dealing
with the global externality. Our main contribution is to show that unique-
ness of the carbon price should still hold in this second best framework. This
is a striking result as we know since Lipsey and Lancaster [19567] that rules
which are optimal in a rst best world fail to be so in a second best world.
To get a better understanding of this result we show that a true decentral-
ization of the second best optimum may be obtained. The world regulator
xes a common carbon tax as well as lump-sum transfers to local govern-
ments. Each of these is then free to deal as it wishes with local externalities
4
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and distortionary taxation needed to nance the provision of local public
goods. This result supports, in a somewhat general setting, Tirole [2009]s
proposition to base climate policy upon a world permits market, leaving each
country free to choose whatever instrument they want to meet their emission
target.
This result relies on the feasibility of arbitrary lump-sum transfers be-
tween countries. This takes us back to the Chichilnisky and Heal [1994] analy-
sis2. Let us rst point out that the issue of the non-negativity of transfers
di¤ers when applied to consumers or to local governments.
The impossibility to levy lump-sum taxes on consumers is motivated by
information problems. Personalized lump-sum transfers are impossible be-
cause governments lack the necessary information about individual charac-
teristics. The Ramsey approach then simply assumes away the possibility to
levy a lump-sum tax on consumers. The use of this approach in the case
of a representative consumer may be, and has often been, criticized on the
grounds that if all agents, in a given country, are identical, nothing prevents
the government from levying the same lump-sum tax on all of them. The
Ramsey approach may nevertheless be considered as a useful short-cut to
analyze a situation where distortionary taxation is required. Sandmo [2000]
p. 97, among others, provides such a defense.
The impossibility to implement arbitrary lump-sum transfers between
governments cannot be motivated by information problems. Political econ-
omy reasons are more convincing. Governments know that their citizens
would probably object to sizable transfers to other governments. The as-
sumption of no inter-governmental transfers may then appear realistic. The
receipts of the world carbon tax, or the product of the sale of the permits,
have to be redistributed however. In our setting, the no inter-governmental
transfers assumption has to be rephrased as the assumption that each coun-
try should receive a positive lump-sum transfer precisely equal to the amount
of carbon taxation supported by its citizens. We examine in a last section the
second best Pareto optimum under this assumption. The non-negativity con-
straint on transfers to consumers still holds. We thus revert to the Chichilnisky
and Heal [1994] result. International di¤erentiation of the carbon price is the
only way to take care of equity concerns. Poorer countries should proba-
2Sheeran [2006] reexamined their argument in a more general setting. Also, Sandmo
[2006] shows in a model without public spending and local externalities that correcting
a global externality by an internationally uniform Pigovian tax is only optimal when
international lump-sum transfers are possible.
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bly pay a lower carbon tax. This result may be put in perspective however.
First, the redistributive gains of such a di¤erentiation of carbon taxes may
be small. A substantial amount of redistribution would then be at the cost of
an important loss of e¢ ciency. Second, accepting to implement direct inter-
governmental transfers would enlarge the domain of feasible allocations. A
step in this direction has been made at the Cancun United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change conference in December 2010. A Green
Climate Fund has been established to assist developing countries in the -
nancing of their climate policies. This new institution should receive by 2020
up to 100 billion dollars per year from developed countries.
We restrict our analysis to the case of local governments which are passive
in the sense that they take as given the world carbon price and the transfers
they receive from the world regulator. Verbon and Withagen [2010] consider
on the contrary the case of active local governments who act stragically
as they understand that their behavior a¤ects the world carbon price. In
a rather general framework, they show that a proper initial allocation of
permits may counter strategic behavior and thus lead to a Pareto e¢ cient
allocation. Ogawa and Wildasin [2009] follow a di¤erent route and show that
local government decisions may, in a very special case, produce a Pareto-
e¢ cient outcome.
The result that the world carbon tax is uniform brings to mind an impor-
tant contribution by Gauthier and Laroque [2009], who show that, in certain
circumstances, rst best rules prevail in a second best world. Our framework
however is quite di¤erent and their result does not apply in our case. We
have altogether di¤erent utility functions, whereas their main result, follow-
ing Atkinson and Stiglitz [1976], assumes identical consumption tastes. Sec-
ondly, and more importantly, we follow the Ramsey approach rather than the
Mirrlees one. Lastly, we have an international dimension and, in particular,
distinguish between transfers to consumers and to countries Our argument
is therefore of a very di¤erent kind.
2 The model
We consider n countries (n  2), indexed by i = 1; 2; :::; n: There is a
representative consumer in each. Each country has an endowment Yi of
a generic good. This good may be used to produce, one for one, a pri-
vate clean good, a local non-polluting public good and a private polluting
6
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good. Pollution is both local and global and encompasses country specic
pollutions and greenhouse emissions contributing to global warming. We de-
note by Ci, Gi and Xi consumptions of the three goods by the represen-
tative consumer in each country. Pollution is denoted by Z: The polluting
good is scaled in such a way that Zi = Xi: World pollution is denoted by
Zw = Z1 + Z1::: + Zn = X1 +X2::: +Xn = Xw: By X we denote the vector
(X1; X2; :::; Xn): The vectors C; Y; G and Z are dened in a similar way.
There is no international trade. Each country consumes its production
of the three goods and only interacts with others through its contribution
to global warming. International transfers of the non-polluting consumption
good will be possible, however. As we saw, the production side of the model
is highly simplied, all marginal costs of production being basically equal
to one, in terms of the generic good. These simplications do not a¤ect our
main results.
The utility function of the representative consumer in jurisdiction i is
U i(Ci; Xi; Gi; Zi; Zw) (1)
We assume U iC ; U
i
X ; U
i
G > 0; U
i
Z ; U
i
Zw
< 0: Here U iC is the partial deriva-
tive with respect to Ci and the other expressions have a similar meaning.
Moreover, we assume that the utility function satises the usual conditions
such as di¤erentiability, concavity in (C;X;G); convexity in (Z;Zw) and, in
maximization processes, allows for interior solutions.
3 First best
3.1 Social optimum
A (rst best) Pareto optimum may be characterized as a feasible alloca-
tion which maximizes a weighted sum of individual utilities, since we can
identify states and their representative consumers. Under convexity assump-
tions, varying the weights provides an easy way to describe the whole set of
Pareto optima. The weights reveal how much the planner cares about each
individual agent. They may be interpreted as the derivatives of a social util-
ity function having individual utility levels as arguments. Some care must
be taken when interpreting the weights along these lines however, as this
interpretation implicitly assumes comparability of individual utility levels.
Ordinal transformations of individual utility functions do not change the set
7
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of social optimal, but do change the weights attached to each one of these
optima.
Let  = (1; 2; :::; n) be the weights attached to the utilities of the
representative consumer in each jurisdiction. A (rst best) Pareto optimum
is a solution of the following problem:
max
nX
i=1
iU
i(Ci; Xi; Gi; Xi; Xw) (2)
subject to the resource constraint
nX
i=1
Yi 
nX
i=1
(Ci +Xi +Gi) (3)
and non-negativity conditions.
Under mild non-satiation conditions, the resource constraint (3) is binding
at a Pareto optimum.
Proposition 1 A rst best Pareto optimum is characterized by the following
conditions:
1U
1
C = ::: = iU
i
C = ::: = nU
n
C (4)
U iG
U iC
= 1; i = 1; 2; ::::; n (5)
U iX
U iC
+
U iZ
U iC
+
nX
j=1
U jZw
U jC
= 1; i = 1; 2; ::::; n (6)
The proof of this proposition is in the appendix, as well as the proofs of
all other propositions.
The three sets of conditions and the resource constraint (3) jointly deter-
mine optimal levels of production of all goods.
Conditions (5) and (6) are e¢ ciency conditions which do not depend on
the social weights  attached to the various consumers. They state that the
consumersmarginal rate of substitution between the three goods should
be equal to one, namely their relative production costs. The MRS between
the polluting good Xi and the non-polluting good Ci takes into account
the negative damages it creates, both locally and worldwide, through global
warming. These damages are evaluated in terms of the private non-polluting
good.
8
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Condition (4) selects a particular Pareto optimum, depending on the cho-
sen social weights attached to individual consumers. It shows that weighted
marginal utilities derived from clean consumption should be equalized across
countries.
Let us now see how this Pareto optimummay be implemented. We assume
that a world regulator is in charge of the control of local and global externali-
ties and of public goods provision. Local governments have no role. Without
loss of generality, we assume that clean consumption is not taxed. The cen-
tral government imposes di¤erentiated pollution taxes i (i = 1; 2; :::; n) on
consumers in all countries. It nances all public spending Gi and makes
direct positive or negative transfers Tci to consumers.
Budget constraints for the consumers and the federal government are:
Ci + (1 + i)Xi = Yi + Tci; i = 1; 2; :::; n (7)
nX
i=1
iXi =
nX
i=1
(Gi + Tci) (8)
The representative consumer of country i maximizes utility under the
budget constraint (7), taking as given pollution levels Zi and Zw. The opti-
mality condition is:
U iX
U iC
= 1 + i; i = 1; 2; :::; n (9)
Comparison with (6) shows that optimality requires tax rates
i =  U
i
Z
U iC
 
nX
j=1
U jZw
U jC
; i = 1; 2; :::; n (10)
with quantities taken at the optimum. Each tax rate appears as the sum
of a local component, equal to the local marginal damage, and a common
global one, equal to the sum of all worldwide marginal damages resulting
from global warming:
i = i +  ; i =  
U iZ
U iC
;  =  
nX
j=1
U jXw
U jC
(11)
With these Pigovian tax rates, condition (9) states that the price of the
polluting good, for the consumer, is equal to its true marginal cost, including
9
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its own marginal production cost, equal to one, and marginal environmental
costs. Optimality also requires proper levels of provision of public goods,
according to condition (5). Finally, lump-sum transfers Tci are used to reach
a specic Pareto optimum, characterized by the weights is attached to each
country. These transfers may be positive or negative. In the case where
rst best Pigovian tax receipts are su¢ cient to nance all rst best public
spendings,
nX
i=1
iXi 
X
Gi;
the world regulators budget constraint (8) shows that the sum
P
Tci of
feasible transfers to consumers is positive. All of them may be positive. In
the opposite case, at least one consumer must receive a negative transfer.
3.2 Decentralization
The analysis of tax rates suggests that the optimal allocation may also be im-
plemented in a more decentralized setting, where a local government imposes
a local tax, aimed at correcting the local externality, while a global (carbon)
tax is implemented at the world level. We may then assume that the world
regulator redistributes the receipts of the carbon tax to local governments
rather than to consumers.
Consumer budget constraints are still (7), with i = i+ . The consumer
pays tax i to the local government and tax  to the world regulator. Let
Ti be the transfer to government i. Local government budget constraints are
Gi + Tci = iXi + Ti (12)
while the world regulator budget constraint is
nX
i=1
Ti = 
nX
i=1
Xi (13)
Carbon tax receipts are redistributed to local governments. Each of them
uses it as well as local tax receipts to nance local public goods provision
and lump-sum transfers to its consumers. Nothing prevents transfers Ti and
Tci from being negative however.
From (7) and (12) we obtain country budget constraints:
Ci +Gi + (1 + )Xi = Yi + Ti; i = 1; 2; :::; n (14)
10
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They can be written as
Ti = Xi + (Ci +Gi +Xi   Yi) ; i = 1; 2; :::; n (15)
Each transfer to a government includes the redistribution of the world
taxes levied on the country and an additional term taking care of the desired
redistribution between countries.
The conclusion of this exercise is that di¤erences in local energy taxes
do not imply to forsake the uniqueness of the carbon tax, provided that
local taxes are optimally designed to counter local externalities. This result
is natural in a rst best setting where lump-sum transfers may be freely
implemented between countries and consumers. The issue is to see whether
this result still holds in a second best setting.
4 Second best
We now assume that governments are unable to nance public good provision
through lump-sum taxation of consumers and must instead resort to distor-
tionary taxation. We follow the Ramsey optimal taxation approach. The new
constraint is simply that lump-sum transfers Tci have to be non-negative.
As was rst shown by Sandmo [1975], the presence of externalities mod-
ies the optimal tax scheme. If Pigovian taxation receipts are su¢ cient to
nance public good provision and the desired redistribution is limited, the
rst best allocation is attainable. Tax receipts are able to nance public
goods provision and some positive lump-sum transfers to consumers. If not,
additional distortionary taxation is required and we switch to a second best
situation.
In our framework, the non-negativity of transfers to consumers takes the
following form, which follows from (7) :
Ci + (1 + i)Xi  Yi; i = 1; 2; :::; n (16)
The overall transfer to a country may be dened as in (15).
4.1 Second best optimum
A world regulator is again in charge of all public decisions. Formally, the
problem is to maximize (2) under the resource constraint (3) and the addi-
11
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tional incentive constraint
U iC (Ci; Xi; Gi; Xi; Xw) (Ci   Yi)+XiU iX (Ci; Xi; Gi; Xi; Xw)  0; i = 1; 2; :::; n
(17)
This is a so-called primal version of constraint (16), where we use the
consumers optimality condition (9) to eliminate the tax rate.
Assuming that the resource constraint is global amounts to accepting that
intercountry transfers Ci + Gi + Xi   Yi may be freely implemented. They
sum to zero and may be positive or negative.
Proposition 2 A second best Pareto optimum with intercountry transfers is
characterized by the following conditions:
1(1 + 1 + 1H
1
C)U
1
C = ::: = n(1 + n + nH
n
c )U
n
C (18)
1 + iH
i
G
1 + i + iH
i
C
U iG
U iC
= 1; i = 1; 2; ::::; n (19)
1 + i + iH
i
X
1 + i + iH
i
C
U iX
U iC
+
1 + iH
i
Z
1 + i + iH
i
C
U iZ
U iC
+
nX
j=1
1 + jH
j
Zw
1 + j + jH
j
C
U jZw
U jC
= 1; i = 1; 2; ::::; n (20)
where
H iC = (Ci   Yi)U iCC=U iC +XiU iXC=U iC (21)
H iG = (Ci   Yi)U iCG=U iG +XiU iXG=U iG (22)
H iX = (Ci   Yi)U iCX=U iX +XiU iXX=U iX (23)
H iZ = (Ci   Yi)U iCZ=U iZ +XiU iXZ=U iZ (24)
H iZw = (Ci   Yi)U iCZw=U iZw +XjU iXZw=U iZw (25)
The conditions for a Pareto optimum must be adjusted to take into ac-
count the impossibility to nance public goods through a lump-sum tax on
consumers. Variable i is the cost of public funds in country i or, more pre-
cisely, the cost of being unable to levy a lump-sum tax on the representative
consumer in this country. It is zero if the world regulator wishes instead to
make a positive transfer Tci to this consumer. It might be the case that the
world regulator wishes to do so for all consumers. This occurs if, on the one
12
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hand, tax receipts from strictly Pigovian taxes (the rst best taxes) prove
su¢ cient to nance all the desired public goods and, on the other hand, the
world regulator is satised with redistributing the excess as positive lump-
sum taxes to all consumers, as he/she does not want to alter too much the
world distribution of income. In such a case all is are zero and the second
best optimality conditions reduce to the rst best ones. This is a very special
case however. A more plausible case is the one where some, or all, is are
positive. First best conditions must then be adjusted to take into account
the costs of public funds.
A particular case is the one where the utility functions (1) are separable
and quasi-linear in Ci. Then U ic equals unity and the cross derivatives are nil
which implies H iC = H
i
G = H
i
Z = H
i
Zw
= 0 and H iX = XiU
i
XX=U
i
X . The rst
two optimality conditions reduce to
1(1 + 1) = ::: = n(1 + n)
U iG = 1 + i
Public goods provision must be pushed in each country to the level where
the marginal utility of public goods equals their production cost, here equal
to one, augmented by the cost i of public funds. Moreover, optimal inter-
national redistribution requires the equality of the weighted overall costs of
public goods 1 + i:
In the general non-linear case, the conditions are modied to take into
account cross-e¤ects represented by the H is, which are sums of second order
elasticities and are standard in the Ramsey approach.
The three sets of conditions appearing in Proposition 2, together with
resource constraint (3) and incentive constraints (17) determine the second
best optimum. Conditions (19) and (20) are e¢ ciency conditions which do not
depend on the social weights . Conditions (18) select a particular optimum,
depending on .
From these necessary conditions we can retrieve the second best optimal
pollution tax i and obtain a meaningful decomposition of this tax rate. It
follows from (9) that U iX = (1 + i)U
i
C : From condition (20), we have the
following.
Corollary 3 In a second best setting with intercountry transfers, the carbon
tax is unique. The overall tax on the polluting good may be decomposed in the
sum of two local taxes and one global tax:
i = i +  i + 
13
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with
i =  
1 + iH
i
Z
1 + i + iH
i
C
U iZ
U iC
;  i = i
H iC  H iX
1 + i + iH
i
C
U iX
U iC
 =  
nX
j=1
1 + jH
j
Xw
1 + j + jH
j
C
U jZw
U jC
Tax i can be seen as a Pigovian tax on polluting the local environment.
Tax  i is a Ramsey tax designed to nance local public good provision.
Finally,  is a world carbon tax needed to curb greenhouse gas emissions.
If the optimal second best allocation is such that country i consumers
receive a positive transfer Tci, the incentive constraint (17) is not binding in
this country and the cost of public funds i equal to zero. The Pigovian tax
i is then equal to the value that yields the rst best (see (11)), while the
Ramsey tax  i designed to provide additional nancing for the public good
is equal to zero.
As in the rst best case, we may allow for some decentralization of taxa-
tion at the local government level. The budget constraints (12) which were
relevant in the case of the rst best, must be adapted to take into account
the local Ramsey taxes  i. Government is budget constraint now is
Gi + Tci = (i +  i)Xi + Ti; Tci  0 (26)
The world regulator collects the carbon tax on consumers and redistributes
the receipts as lump-sum transfers Ti to local governments. The sum of these
transfers is positive but some of them may be negative. If local Pigovian
taxation receipts iXi are large, or if redistribution favors country i, taking
the form of a large positive Ti, the country will not have to rely too much
on the supplementary distortive tax to nance the provision of public goods.
The cost i of public funds will be low. It may even be zero, in which case
the supplementary Ramsey tax  i becomes zero and the government may
make a positive transfer Tci to its consumers.
The striking thing here is that the carbon tax  is unique: it is the same
for all states involved. This result would seem natural in a rst best setting.
It is much more surprising in a second best framework, where optimal rules
are usually quite di¤erent from what they would be in a rst best. The virtues
of a unique carbon tax and its ability to provide proper incentives are much
less compelling when specic constraints preexist and unavoidably introduce
many distortions in the economy. Di¤erentiated carbon prices might then
14
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appear as a useful compromise between e¢ ciency and equity. We do assume
the feasibility of lump-sum international transfers, which allows to take into
account equity concerns. This does not free us from the constraints of a
second best world however.
4.2 Decentralization through a world carbon price and
intercountry transfers
To put our result in perspective, we now show that the second best optimum
may be obtained in a decentralized way. The world regulator sets the world
carbon tax and lump-sum transfers to local governments. Each of these is
then free to deal as it wishes with local externalities and distortionary taxa-
tion needed to nance the provision of local public goods.
A close examination of the determination of a second best Pareto opti-
mum suggests a two stage solution method. Let us rewrite the problem
max
C;X;G;Zw
nX
i=1
iU
i(Ci; Xi; Gi; Xi; Zw)
U iC (Ci; Xi; Gi; Xi; Zw) (Ci   Yi)+XiU iX (Ci; Xi; Gi; Xi; Zw)  0; i = 1; :::; n
(27)
nX
i=1
Xi = Zw (28)
nX
i=1
(Ci +Xi +Gi) 
nX
i=1
Yi (29)
We may check that this problem is equivalent to a problem where we
introduce new variables  and Ti, i = 1; :::; n and substitute constraints
Ci +Gi + (1 + )Xi = Yi + Ti; i = 1; 2; :::; n (30)
nX
i=1
Ti  Zw: (31)
to constraint (29).
Taking into account (28), constraints (30) and (31) imply (29). Recipro-
cally, for any arbitrary  , consider a triplet (C;X;G) satisfying (29). Dene
15
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Ti = Ci+Gi+(1+)Xi Yi; i = 1; 2; :::; n. Summing implies
P
Ti Zw =P
(Ci +Gi +Xi   Yi) which is negative as (C;X;G) satises (29). Thus
constraint (31) is satised.
Let us now consider the maximization of social welfare under constraints
(28), (30) and (31). We may solve this problem in two stages. For given Zw, 
and T , we rst look, for all i, forCi, Gi,Xi which maximize U i(Ci; Xi; Gi; Xi; Zw)
under constraints (27) and (30). This yields functions
Ci = 
i( ; Ti; Zw); Xi = 
i( ; Ti; Zw); Gi = 
i( ; Ti; Zw)
and the indirect utility function
W i ( ; Ti; Zw)
In the second stage, we solve the following problem3:
max
;T;Zw
nX
i=1
iW
i ( ; Ti; Zw)
under constraints (29) and (31), (29) being now written as
nX
i=1
i( ; Ti; Zw) = Zw
This procedure may be interpreted as a decentralized implementation
of a second best optimum. The world regulator controls carbon emissions,
through a permit market or a carbon tax. It is clearer to assume the former.
The world regulator chooses a maximum amount Zw of emissions, sells o¤
the permits to local governments and distributes the proceeds as lump-sum
transfers to local governments. These transfers may be negative in order to
further subsidize other countries. A unique carbon price is thus imposed at
the world level. Each local government is still unable to nance its public
goods provision through lump-sum taxation. But it is left free to choose
its own way to levy funds and regulate local externalities. A subsidiarity
principle is thus in e¤ect.
3The carbon price  is not a choice variable since it is determined endogenously through
the equilibrium of the permits market. However, as stressed by Shiell [2003], it is math-
ematically equivalent to treat it as a choice variable subject to the constraint that the
permits market clears.
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Local governments are passive in the sense that they take as given the
price  of permits as well as total emissions Zw and transfers Tis. Their prob-
lem is to maximize the utility of their representative consumer under their
country budget constraint (14) and their incentive constraint (17). We do not
make explicit the precise way they will implement this solution. The world
regulator only takes into account the indirect utility function W i ( ; Ti; Zw)
of each country and the associated demand of permits i( ; Ti; Zw).
Proposition 4 A second best optimum with intercountry transfers may be
implemented by a world regulator controlling the total amount of emissions,
imposing a unique carbon price and implementing intercountry lump-sum
transfers.
This result shows how e¤ective a unique carbon price remains in a frame-
work where each country faces second best constraints. Control of total
emissions and intercountry transfers are the sole international coordination
required to reach a social optimum. We also note that the proof does not de-
pend on the form of the incentive constraints and is therefore quite general.
This proof provides a deeper explanation of the uniqueness of the carbon
tax. Our rst proof relies on the inspection of optimality conditions. The
decentralization described in this section shows that this uniqueness property
is in fact the consequence of a subsidiarity principle. The world regulator
does not have to take into account the precise way in which each country
regulates local externalities and nances the provision of its public goods.
He may trust that this is achieved e¢ ciently and only care about the global
climatic externality and the proper distribution of permits. In some sense,
the international regulation of the climatic externality remains a rst best
problem.
4.3 Second best without intercountry transfers
We now assume, as in Shiell [2003], that for political economy reasons, local
governments are not ready to accept a smaller transfer than the amount of
carbon taxes they are paying to the world regulator. Each local government
actually receives a positive transfer from the world regulator, as the coun-
try level of emissions is always positive. There are no other intercountry
transfers. Each country then has to satisfy constraint
Ci +Xi +Gi = Yi; i = 1; 2; :::; n (32)
17
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The problem is to maximize (2) under the resource constraints (32) and
the additional incentive constraints (17).
Proposition 5 A second best Pareto optimum without intercountry transfers
is characterized by the following conditions:
i
 
1 + j + jH
j
X

U jX +
 
1 + jH
j
Z

U jZ  
 
1 + j + jH
j
C

U iC
	
=
 
X
j
 
1 + jH
j
Z

U jZw ; i = 1; 2; ::::; n (33)
1 + iH
i
G
1 + i + iH
i
C
U iG
U iC
= 1; i = 1; 2; ::::; n (34)
nX
j=1
 
1 + jH
j
Zw

U jZw 
1 + j + jH
j
C

U jC  
 
1 + j + jH
j
X

U jX  
 
1 + jH
j
Z

U jZ
= 1 (35)
The three sets of conditions appearing in Proposition 5, together with the
resource constraints (3) and incentive constraints (17) determine the second
best optimum without transfers. Condition (34) governing the provision of
public goods is the same as the one which appears in the second best optimum
with intercountry transfers (condition (19)). Condition (35) is implied by
the set of similar conditions (20) appearing in the case with transfers. Indeed,
(20) may be written as
(1 + i + iH
i
X)U
i
X + (1 + iH
i
Z)U
i
Z   (1 + i + iH iC)U iC
(1 + i + iH
i
C)U
i
C
=  
nX
j=1
1 + jH
j
Zw
1 + j + jH
j
C
U jZw
U jC
; i = 1; 2; ::::; n (36)
Dividing through by the common value of the LHS yields (35).
Consider now a particular allocation in the set of second best optima
with intercountry transfers, where all transfers happen to be zero. Such an
equilibrium usually exists and is unique. By denition it satises constraints
(32) and therefore all constraints entering the denition of a second best
optimum without intercountry transfers. We just showed that it satises all
the optimality conditions for such an optimum. We thus conrm the rather
natural property that, in general, one of the second best optima without
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intercountry transfers is a particular second best optimum with intercountry
transfers. Both hypersurfaces in the space of utility levels will be tangent.
This property has been stressed by Shiell [2003].
Other second best optimum allocations without transfers are not second
best optimum allocations with transfers. As we now show, this means that
di¤erentiated carbon prices will be necessary to support them.
Corollary 6 In a second best setting without intercountry transfers, the car-
bon tax is generally not unique. The overall tax on the polluting good can be
decomposed into three country-specic taxes:
i = i +  i +  i
with
i =  
1 + iH
i
Z
1 + i + iH
i
C
U iZ
U iC
;  i = i
H iC  H iX
1 + i + iH
i
C
U iX
U iC
 i =   1
i (1 + i + iH
i
C)U
i
C
X
j
 
1 + jH
j
Xw

U jZw
The expressions of the Pigovian and the Ramsey tax rates i and  i are
the same than in the case with intercountry transfers. The carbon tax  i is
now country-specic. More precisely, we have
1(1 + 1 + 1H
1
C)U
1
C i = ::: = n(1 + n + nH
n
c )U
n
Cn (37)
Carbon prices are not equalized worldwide. Only weighted carbon prices are,
the weight of country i being i(1+i+iH
i
C)U
i
C . This generalizes the similar
relation which underlines the results of Chichilnisky and Heal [1994]. As we
take into account the provision of public goods, a new element 1+i+iH
i
C
appears which takes into account the cost of public funds in the country.
We may then restate the core of the Chichilnisky and Heal [1994] argu-
ment. In the case where intercountry transfers are feasible, condition (18) in
Proposition 2 states that country weights are equalized. It follows that car-
bon prices, and abatement costs in the Chichilnisky and Heal [1994] set-up,
are equalized. In the absence of intercountry transfers, the weights are not
equalized and neither are the optimal carbon prices.
We may assume that social weights  reect the world regulators aversion
to inequality, which would automatically follow if we deduced them from the
maximization of a symmetric international social utility function. A poorer
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country is then characterized by a higher i. This leads to reduction of in-
equality, but probably not its disappearance. A poorer country presumably
remains poorer in the double sense that it has both a lower level of consump-
tion, and therefore a higher marginal utility U iC of consumption, and a higher
cost of public funds, and therefore a higher 1 + i + iH
i
C coe¢ cient. We
may thus safely assume that a poorer country is characterized by a larger
weight i(1 + i + iH
i
C)U
i
C . The carbon price  i must then be lower in a
poorer country. A smaller environmental e¤ort must be required from poor
countries, which is simply another part of the worldwide social optimization.
5 Conclusion
It has been shown that the presence of public goods, restrictions on the
redistributions of local tax revenues to local consumers, and the addition of
a local component to the damage caused by global emissions does in principle
not aggravate the problem of addressing the design of a second best optimal
global pollution tax. An appropriate decomposition of the pollution tax can
deal with the local aspect of pollution and with the constraint that only
non-negative transfers can be given to local consumers. Hence, the global
externality can be dealt with at the global level, through a uniform tax
or a system of tradable permits. Nevertheless it is required that at the
government levels international transfers can still be implemented. And it
cannot be hoped that this problem can be solved. Indeed, it is uncertain that
governments will accept negative lump-sum transfers and even to receive less
than what the country paid as carbon taxes. Chichilnisky and Heal [1994]
have stressed that the impossibility of international redistribution should lead
to reject the principle of equalizing worldwide abatement costs, that is having
a unique world carbon price. If we introduce constraints on intercountry
transfers into our model, a unique carbon price would not allow to reach
the desired second best optimum. International di¤erentiation of the price
of carbon sometimes provides a useful instrument to reach a more equitable
allocation. However, when it comes to climate change international transfers
(whether monetary or technological or in terms of allocating permits) are in
the picture already. The international community is aware of the fact that
in reaching international agreements side payments are unavoidable.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
Let  be the Lagrange multiplier associated to the resource constraint. Nec-
essary conditions are:
iU
i
C = ; i = 1; 2; ::::; n (38)
iU
i
G = ; i = 1; 2; ::::; n (39)
i
 
U iX + U
i
Z

+
nX
j=1
jU
j
Zw
= ; i = 1; 2; ::::; n (40)
Conditions (38) and (39) yield condition (5) in Proposition 1.
Dividing both sides of (40) by , and noting from (38) that  may be
taken equal to iU
i
C or to any of the jU
j
C yields
U iX
U iC
+
U iZ
U iC
+
nX
j=1
U jZw
U jC
= 1; i = 1; 2; ::::; n
which is condition (6) in Proposition 1.
B Proof of Proposition 2 and Corollary 3
Let  and ei = ii be the Lagrange multipliers associated to constraints
(3) and (17). i will be interpreted as the cost of public funds in country i.
Assuming an interior solution for (Ci; Xi; Gi; XiXw) > 0, we can write
the optimality conditions as follows:
iU
i
C

1 + i + iH
i
C
	
=  (41)
iU
i
G

1 + iH
i
G
	
=  (42)
iU
i
X
 
1 + i + iH
i
X

+ iU
i
Z
 
1 + iH
i
Z

+
nX
j=1
jU
j
Xw
 
1 + jH
j
Xw

= 
(43)
(41) and (42) yield condition (19) in Proposition 2.
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Dividing (43) by  and choosing from (41), in each place, the appropriate
expression for  leads to (20) in Proposition 2. This equation may be written
as
1 + i
H iX  H iC
1 + i + iH
i
C

U iX
U iC
+
1 + iH
i
Z
1 + i + iH
i
C
U iZ
U iC
+
nX
j=1
1 + jH
j
Zw
1 + j + jH
j
C
U jZw
U jC
= 1
or
U iX
U iC
 1 =  i
H iX  H iC
1 + i + iH
i
C
U iX
U iC
  1 + iH
i
Z
1 + i + iH
i
C
U iZ
U iC
 
nX
j=1
1 + jH
j
Zw
1 + j + jH
j
C
U jZw
U jC
which is Corollary 3.
C Proof of Proposition 5 and Corollary 6
Let i and ei = ii be the Lagrange multipliers associated to constraints
(32) and (17). Optimality conditions are, for i = 1; 2; ::::; n,
i
 
1 + i + iH
i
C

U iC = i (44)
i
 
1 + iH
i
G

U iG = i (45)
i
 
1 + i + iH
i
X

U iX +
 
1 + iH
i
Z

U iZ
	
= i  
nX
j=1
j
 
1 + jH
j
Z

U jZw
(46)
(44) and (45) imply (34) in Proposition 5.
From (44) and (46) we have
i
 
1 + i + iH
i
X

U iX +
 
1 + iH
i
Z

U iZ  
 
1 + i + iH
i
C

U iC
	
=
 
nX
j=1
j
 
1 + jH
j
Z

U jZw ; i = 1; 2; ::::; n (47)
The RHS does not depend on i so that all the LHS are equal for all i.
Dividing through by this common value, and in particular dividing each term
of the sum by the j-indexed expression of the LHS yields
1 =
nX
j=1
 
1 + jH
j
Zw

U jZw 
1 + j + jH
j
C

U jC  
 
1 + j + jH
j
X

U jX  
 
1 + jH
j
Z

U jZ
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which is (35) in Proposition 5.
Condition (47) may be written as
1 + i
H iX  H iC
1 + i + iH
i
C

U iX
U iC
+
1 + iH
i
Z
1 + i + iH
i
C
U iZ
U iC
  1 =
  1
i (1 + i + iH
i
C)U
i
C
X
j
 
1 + jH
j
Z

U jZw
or
U iX
U iC
  1 =   1 + iH
i
Z
1 + i + iH
i
C
U iZ
U iC
  i
H iX  H iC
1 + i + iH
i
C
U iX
U iC
  1
i (1 + i + iH
i
C)U
i
C
X
j
 
1 + jH
j
Z

U jZw
which is Corollary 6.
References
References
[1976] Atkinson, A., Stiglitz, J., 1976. The design of tax structure: direct
versus indirect taxation. Journal of Public Economics 6, 5575.
[1994] Chichilnisky, G., Heal, G., 1994. Who Should Abate Carbon Emis-
sions? An International Perspective, Economic Letters 44, 443449.
[2009] Gauthier, S., Laroque, G., 2009. Separability and Public Finance,
Journal of Public Economics 93, 11681174.
[19567] Lipsey, R. G., Lancaster, K., 19567. The General Theory of Second
Best, Review of Economic Studies 24, 1132.
[2009] Ogawa, H., Wildasin, D. E., 2009. Think Locally, Act Locally:
Spillovers, Spillbacks, and E¢ cient Decentralized Policymaking,
American Economic Review 99(4), 120617.
[1975] Sandmo, A., 1975. Optimal Taxation in the Presence of Externali-
ties, Swedish Journal of Economics 77, 8698.
23
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2011.76
[2000] Sandmo, A., 2000. The Public Economics of the Environment, The
Lindhal Lectures, Oxford University Press.
[2006] Sandmo, A., 2006. Global Public Economics: Public Goods and
Externalities, Economie Publique 1819, 321.
[2006] Sheeran, K. A., 2006. Who Should Abate Carbon Emissions? A
Note, Environmental and Resource Economics 35, 8998.
[2003] Shiell, L., 2003. Equity and e¢ ciency in international markets for
pollution permits, Journal of Environmental Economics and Man-
agement 46, 3851.
[2009] Tirole, J., 2009. Politique climatique, une nouvelle architecture in-
ternationale, Rapport No 87 pour le Conseil dAnalyse Economique.
[2010] Verbon H., Withagen, C., 2010. Do permit allocation matters? CE-
Sifo Working Paper Series No. 3236.
24
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2011.76
